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IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF NO ONE: 
HOW NEW YORK’S “BEST INTERESTS OF 
THE CHILD” LAW VIOLATES PARENTS’ 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO THE CARE, 
CUSTODY, AND CONTROL OF THEIR 
CHILDREN 
NICOLE LAPSATIS† 
INTRODUCTION 
The only permanent rule in the game of Calvinball is that 
you can never play the game with the same rule twice.1  Calvin, a 
six-year-old imaginative comic figure from Bill Watterson’s 
famous comic, Calvin and Hobbes,2 created Calvinball with the 
intention of making a game that could not be more disorganized.3  
Any player may declare a new rule at any point in the game.4  
Zones on the playing field are created “spontaneously and 
inconsistently by players.”5  Score does not need to be kept with 
any logical consistency.6  Penalties may be in any form deemed 
fit.7  And, “[a]ny rule that is carried out during the course of the 
game may never be used again.”8 
 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2012, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A., Economics, New York University. With thanks to 
Professor Teresa Grogan for her guidance and suggestions in writing this Note. A 
special thanks to my family for their continuous encouragment and endless love and 
support. 
1 See 2 BILL WATTERSON, THE COMPLETE CALVIN AND HOBBES 292 (2005). 
2 Id. at 1. 
3 See id. at 268–73. 
4 See id. at 273. 
5 Calvinball and Calvinball Rules, The Official Rules of Calvinball, 
http://www.insaner.com/calvinball/rules.html (last visited on Jan. 31, 2013). Zones 
may also disappear and appear whenever a player decides. See id. 
6 See WATTERSON, supra note 1, at 292 (noting that score can be kept with both 
letters and numbers—“The score is still Q to 12!”). 
7 See Calvinball and Calvinball Rules, supra note 5. 
8 Id. 
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While a game with no rules is exactly the type of fictional 
game a six-year-old boy wants to play with his talking stuffed 
animal, it is hardly the type of playing field parents want to 
engage in when litigating their most fundamental rights.  Yet 
New York family law has adopted the Calvinball approach in 
determining custody disputes.  There is no determinative 
standard governing the allocation of custody.  Judges may 
declare whatever factors they want to consider and may consider 
new factors at any point in the litigation.  They need not 
attribute weight to every factor or even allot consistent degrees of 
weight to each factor.  And no two judges need to follow the same 
approach or come to the same result. 
Results in custody disputes, however, go far beyond losing a 
game of Calvinball, to the infringement of a parent’s 
constitutional right.  Parents, whether they were once married or 
not,9 have a fundamental constitutional right to the care, 
custody, and control of their children.10  An award of sole legal 
custody assigns one parent the right to make decisions 
concerning the child,11 and takes away the other parent’s right to 
engage in “decision-making authority and responsibility about 
larger issues, most typically healthcare, education and religion.”12  
The custodial parent has “final say” over decisions concerning the 
upbringing of the child, and the non-custodial parent is forced to 
remain absent from involvement in the child’s upbringing,13 
ultimately stripping the non-custodial parent of his or her 
constitutional right. 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized 
that individuals are “entitled to constitutional protection—
regarding . . . decisions concerning the upbringing of their 
children, and the retention of their children through the exercise 
of custody.”14  Like all other fundamental constitutional rights, a 
 
9 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972). 
10 See infra note 14. 
11 See Russell I. Marnell, Joint Custody in New York: A Statute Whose Time Has 
Come?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 26, 1995, at 7, available at http://www.marnelllaw.com/ 
downloads/new_york_law_april_1995.pdf. 
12 Joy S. Rosenthal, An Argument for Joint Custody as an Option for All Family 
Court Mediation Program Participants, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 127, 146 (2007). 
13 Id. 
14 Holly L. Robinson, Joint Custody: Constitutional Imperatives, 54 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 27, 40 (1985); see, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000); Hodgson 
v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 445–46 (1990); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257–59 
(1983) (recognizing the Constitutional protection afforded to a parent’s right in the 
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parent’s right to the care, custody, and control of his or her child 
cannot be deprived unless the state has established a compelling 
interest15 and there is no less restrictive means of achieving that 
interest.16  The state cannot justify infringing on the “the private 
realm of family life” based on arbitrary legislative action, without 
any purpose, and without regard to the child’s well-being.17 
Contrary to Supreme Court precedent, New York’s 
Calvinball-like standard for determining custody disputes, 
absent child abuse, neglect, and domestic violence, works to 
violate parents’ fundamental right to the care, custody, and 
control of their children without a compelling justification for 
doing so.  New York is a “best interests” state.  New York’s 
Domestic Relations Law §240 states that any court considering 
questions of custody must determine what is in “the best 
interests of the child.”18  This “statutory mandate is deliberately 
broad” and provides no concrete guidance as to what a court 
should consider when determining a child’s best interests.19  The 
law leaves entirely in the judge’s discretion the power to create 
and modify the general rules that apply to custody disputes.20  
Even in light of the criteria that courts have developed, the “best 
interests of the child” test permits courts to consider a number of 
 
custody, care, and upbringing of his or her child); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 
(1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (noting that the primary role of 
parents in the upbringing of their children “is now established beyond debate as an 
enduring American tradition”). 
15 See Robinson, supra note 14, at 56; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 
431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (requiring a compelling state interest to justify burdens on 
right to obtain contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (requiring that 
state show compelling interests to justify interference with women’s right to 
abortion). 
16 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 
(rejecting a statute burdening abortion rights because the statute was not drawn 
narrowly enough to protect only compelling state interests); see also Lois Shepherd, 
Looking Forward with the Right of Privacy, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 251, 263 (2001) 
(explaining that once a right is determined to be fundamental, the state is required 
to show a compelling state interest and that the regulation is narrowly tailored). 
17 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
18 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (West, Westlaw through L.2011, chs. 1–54, 57–
495). 
19 Alan D. Scheinkman, Custody and Visitation, in 12 N.Y. PRAC. NEW YORK 
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 21:13 (West 2009) [hereinafter Custody and 
Visitation]. 
20 See Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family 
Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1171 (1986). That discretion can 
potentially produce a coherent body of law only if judges were to be instructed on a 
desirable outcome. See id. 
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non-binding factors, and there are no clear and definite 
guidelines instructing the courts how to determine what is 
actually in the best interests of the child. 
In theory, a judge, guided by judicially created criteria, will 
use his or her discretion to determine what custody arrangement 
is truly the best for each child.21  The Legislature has determined 
that the only way for courts to “decide each individual case on its 
own facts” is through an indefinite standard.22  But case law 
suggests that under the imprecise system that the Legislature 
has allowed to exist, a judge may exercise unrestrained 
discretion “in a manner that permits decision-making based upon 
value judgments and bias.”23  A judge, acting under the protective 
cloak of the “best interests of the child” rule, could not only grant 
custody to one parent, but, at the same time, could take away a 
fit parent’s custodial right without actually determining that it is 
in the child’s best interest to do so.  There is no guarantee that 
judges will “tailor the decision to justly fit the particular 
circumstances” of a case.24  And there is certainly no guarantee 
that a custody arrangement, driven by whatever the judge 
considers to be a better familial situation, will promote the child’s 
best interests.25 
 
 
 
 
21 See Custody and Visitation, supra note 19 (proposing that the best interests of 
the child standard does not need to offer much real guidance because the court 
should, at all times, be concerned with and should strive to do what is best for the 
child). 
22 Id. 
23 Leah A. Hill, Do You See What I See? Reflections on How Bias Infiltrates the 
New York City Family Court—the Case of the Court Ordered Investigation, 40 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527, 535 (2007); see also Robinson, supra note 14, at 59 
(“Such a standard is extremely susceptible to a judge’s personal value judgments 
regarding what is best for children, since the intended content of the term ‘best’ is 
not defined.”). 
24 See Custody and Visitation, supra note 19. 
25 In fact, there is more of a guarantee that the wide discretion afforded to 
judges in custody disputes limits a parent’s ability to get a tenuous decision 
overturned. See discussion infra Part III.A.3. The ill-defined “best interests of the 
child” standard works to protect a trial court’s decision, regardless of whether the 
decision is driven by personal value judgments and biases and is really not in the 
best interests of the child. 
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The problem of potentially biased decision-making, whether 
it is intentional or unintentional,26 is aggravated by the challenge 
of gathering and analyzing complete information about each 
child’s situation in New York custody proceedings.  There is a 
myriad of problems with the process of deciding custody disputes 
in both New York family and supreme courts.27  The Matrimonial 
Commission (“Commission”), in its report to the Chief Judge of 
the State of New York, noted that many improvements need to be 
made in administering divorces, including several areas that 
affect custody disputes.28  The Commission recognized the 
“extremely heavy caseloads” in matrimonial parts and the close 
monitoring required in all matrimonial matters and supported 
the need for additional assistance and resources in these parts.29  
The Commission acknowledged that the “administration, 
resource and facilities issues . . . are not limited to matrimonial 
parts”; rather, family courts toil with these problems as well.30  
In light of all the constraints affecting the court systems and the 
conditions under which judges determine issues of custody, 
judges face a huge obstacle in evaluating and deciding what is 
truly in the best interests of the child. 
 
26 A judge’s use of personal biases and value judgments is not always 
necessarily an intentional action; rather, because of the ambiguity of the “best 
interests of the child” rule, a judge is put in a position where he or she may have to 
rely on personal value judgments to fill the gaps of the “best interests” rule. 
27 Family courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving custody, 
visitation, child support, guardianship of children, abuse and neglect, support, 
paternity, foster care, and termination of parental rights to guardianship and 
custody of children. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 115 (West, Westlaw through L.2006). 
Proceedings brought to annul a marriage, for separation, or for divorce are heard in 
New York State supreme courts. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (West, Westlaw 
through L.2011). Therefore, parents who are unmarried must litigate disputes 
regarding their children in family court, while parents who are married must 
litigate disputes regarding their children, stemming from a divorce, separation, or 
annulment, in supreme court. 
28 Sondra Miller, Appendix A: Matrimonial Commission of the State of New 
York, Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 987, 987 
(2007) [hereinafter Matrimonial Commission Report] (recommending many changes 
in several areas including the selection and education of judges, the administration 
of the legal process, the appointment and regulations of experts and law guardians, 
access to the justice system, the pursuance of research in the area of family law, and 
the increase in public awareness and education regarding the rights of parties 
engaged in divorce and custody matters). 
29 Id. at 1018–19. 
30 Id. at 1020. 
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Custody disputes, however, would be better and more 
consistently decided if a joint custody presumption was adopted 
in New York.  New York “remains one of a rapidly diminishing 
number of states without a statute for joint custody.”31  A statute 
requiring a presumption of joint custody is exactly what New 
York needs—one that protects parents’ right to the care, custody, 
and control of their children, all the while adequately ensuring a 
child’s best interests.  Under this joint custody presumption, 
judges would have to presume that joint legal custody must be 
awarded unless the state has a compelling justification not to 
grant joint custody.  A state, acting under the doctrine of parens 
patriae, has an obligation to protect the interests and welfare of 
children.32  A state, however, cannot protect a child’s right to the 
extent that it infringes on another individual’s fundamental right 
without a compelling justification for doing so.33  There must be a 
finding of some detriment or harm to the child as a result of joint 
custody in order to justify granting exclusive custody to one 
parent and stripping the other parent of all custodial and 
decision-making rights. 
This Note argues that New York State’s procedure for 
determining custody disputes allows a judge to abridge parents’ 
fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their 
children without evidence of a compelling justification.  
Specifically, this Note argues that because of New York’s 
nebulous standard for determining what is the best interest of 
the child, more often than not, a judge is forced to substitute 
personal value judgments and biases to compensate for the lack 
of clear guidance provided to judges in order to determine what is 
in the child’s best interests.  A judge, after attempting to 
overcome the systemic barriers resulting from custody courts, 
can decide to grant sole custody to one parent over another based 
on certain considerations that genuinely do not affect the best 
interests of the child. 
Part I discusses a parent’s fundamental constitutional right 
to the care, custody, and control of his or her child and the 
requisite justification to infringe on that right.  Part II defines 
 
31 Marnell, supra note 11. 
32 See infra notes 100, 183–85 and accompanying text. 
33 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (noting that a state’s 
countervailing interests must be weighed against the loss a parent would suffer as a 
result of the state’s infringement on his or her fundamental right). 
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New York’s “best interests of the child” rule.  Part III analyzes 
the ways in which the “best interests of the child” rule actually 
operates in determining custody disputes when there is no 
allegation of child abuse, neglect, or domestic violence.  This Part 
addresses all the shortcomings in implementing New York’s “best 
interests of the child” test, including the administrative burdens 
a judge faces in determining what custodial arrangement would 
most benefit the child’s interests.  Lastly, Part IV advocates for a 
solution that would address all the impediments of New York’s 
“best interests of the child” test—a default presumption in favor 
of a joint custodial relationship.  Part IV argues that a 
presumption in favor of joint legal custody, absent any proof of 
detriment or harm to the child, would operate to both protect a 
parent’s fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his 
or her child and protect the child’s best interests. 
I. PARENTHOOD IS A FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
When deciding issues of custody, most judges refer to their 
decisions as the “awarding” or “granting” of custody.34  Contrary 
to its implication, an “award” of custody is not a reward of a right 
above and beyond what each parent is entitled to; it confirms a 
fundamental right already vested in the parent.  Parents’ 
interests in the care, custody, and control of their children are 
“perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by [the Supreme Court]” and protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment from unjustified infringement by the 
state.35  The Supreme Court has established “extensive 
precedent” regarding the cardinal rights of parents over their 
children.36  Stemming from the Court’s decision in Meyer v. 
Nebraska,37 it is now recognized that parents, by virtue of their 
 
34 See, e.g., Dewitt v. Sheiness, 42 A.D.3d 776, 777–78, 840 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209–
10 (3d Dep’t 2007) (finding that the trial court had sound and substantial basis for 
granting ex-husband custody of child); Allain v. Allain, 35 A.D.3d 513, 514, 826 
N.Y.S.2d 411, 412 (2d Dep’t 2006) (finding that the lower court’s “determination 
awarding sole custody of the parties’ son to the father has a sound and substantial 
basis in the record.”); Smulczeski v. Smulczeski, 18 A.D.3d 734, 735, 797 N.Y.S.2d 
97, 98 (2d Dep’t 2005) (“The record supports the Supreme Court's conclusion that 
awarding the defendant custody of the parties' two children was in the best interest 
of the children . . . .”). 
35 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
36 Id. at 66. 
37 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
FINAL_LAPSATIS 2/21/2013  12:39 PM 
680 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:673   
status as a parent,38 “possess a fundamental liberty interest—
entitled to constitutional protection—regarding . . . decisions 
concerning the upbringing of their children, and the retention of 
their children through the exercise of custody.”39  Absent 
“powerful countervailing interest[s]” concerning the child’s well-
being, a parent’s right to the care, custody, and control of his or 
her child cannot be taken away or infringed upon.40 
A. Parents’ Well-Established Constitutional Right to the Care, 
Custody, and Control of Their Children 
Early Supreme Court cases dealing with the issue of 
parental rights focused on a parent’s constitutional right to make 
decisions regarding his or her child’s upbringing and well-being.41  
In Meyer, the Court invalidated an act that forbade the teaching 
of languages other than English to students that had not passed 
the eighth grade.42  The Court reasoned that the “liberty” 
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment include the 
rights of parents to “bring up [their] children”43 and “control the 
education of their own.”44  The Court recognized that a parent 
retains a constitutional right to be the arbiter of questions that 
concern his or her child’s well-being.  If a parent wants to enroll 
his or her child in a certain school, or teach the child a different 
language, the parent is entitled to do so as long as his or her 
decision is not harmful to the child.45  This liberty interest “may 
 
38 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (emphasizing the importance 
of the family and the essential “basic civil rights of man” to “conceive and to raise 
one’s children” (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)) (citing 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923))). 
39 Robinson, supra note 14. 
40 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. 
41 Although early on the Court had not specifically coined the term “care, 
custody, and control,” the Court was implicitly referring to a parent’s fundamental 
right to maintain custody over his or her child by declaring that parents have a 
constitutional right to make decisions concerning their child’s well-being. It is only 
through the exercise of legal custody that a parent would be involved in making 
decisions concerning the child’s well-being. See supra note 11 and accompanying 
text. Therefore, the Court’s early holdings regarding a parent’s right to make 
decisions concerning his or her child’s upbringing can be read in accordance with the 
Court’s belated adoption of the term “care, custody, and control” to describe a 
parent’s fundamental parental right. 
42 See 262 U.S. at 397, 402. 
43 Id. at 399. 
44 Id. at 401. 
45 See id. at 400 (finding that within the protected liberty of the Fourteenth 
Amendment parents have a fundamental right to undertake their “natural duty” as 
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not be interfered with . . . by legislative action which is arbitrary 
or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the 
competency of the state to effect.”46 
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, a case 
involving the validity of a state statute that required parents to 
send their children to public school,47 the Court confirmed that 
the liberty of parents includes the right “to direct the upbringing 
and education of children under their control.”48  The Court 
explained that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; 
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations.”49  A parent’s right to engage in his or her 
child’s upbringing includes the right to impress on his or her 
child moral standards, religious beliefs, and attributes of a good 
citizen.50 
Since Pierce, the Court has firmly established that parents 
have a fundamental right over the care, custody, and control of 
their children, which encompasses a parent’s right to the 
upbringing of his or her child.  In Prince v. Massachusetts, the 
Court declared it a cardinal principle “that the custody, care and 
nurture of the child reside first in the parents.”51  A parent’s 
“primary function and freedom include[s] preparation for 
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”52  When it 
comes to regulating parental rights, a state’s paramount concern 
is whether a parent’s nurturing and care presents a “clear and 
present danger” to the child.53  Absent a showing of clear and 
present danger, which warrants protection by the state, a parent 
has a fundamental right, free from governmental interference, to 
retain custody over and raise his or her child.54 
 
 
parents and enroll their children in any schooling that “cannot reasonably be 
regarded as harmful”). 
46 Id. at 399–400. 
47 268 U.S. 510, 533–34 (1925). 
48 Id. at 534–35. 
49 Id. at 535. 
50 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). 
51 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 167. 
54 See id. 
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The Court again stressed the importance of a parent’s 
fundamental right in the care, custody, and control of his or her 
child in Stanley v. Illinois.55  In Stanley, the Court held 
unconstitutional an Illinois statute that presumed that every 
father of a child born out of wedlock was unfit to have custody of 
his children, making the child an automatic ward of the state 
upon his or her mother’s death.56  In Stanley, there was nothing 
in the record to indicate that the father had not cared for or 
neglected his children.57  For that reason, the Court considered 
the effect of the statute on the children—taking the children from 
their suitable father and placing them in the hands of the state—
emphasizing “the importance of the family” and the essentialness 
of a parent’s right to “raise one’s children.”58  It was evident to 
the Court in Stanley that a parent’s right to the “care, custody, 
and management of his or her children” is a substantial right 
that “undeniably warrants deference” and protection.59  
Accordingly, the statute’s automatic destruction of the father’s 
custodial right without the court considering his fitness, violated 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.60 
The notion that parents’ rights require firm deference was 
affirmed in Santosky v. Kramer.61  The Court’s rationale was 
based on the “historical recognition that freedom of personal 
choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”62  This fundamental 
liberty interest does not evaporate simply because a parent has 
not been a model parent.63  Rather, parents faced with the 
“dissolution of their parental rights have a . . . critical need for 
procedural protections.”64  The state’s countervailing interests 
must be weighed against the loss the parent would suffer as a 
result of the infringement on his or her fundamental parental 
 
55 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
56 Id. at 658. The Court held that the father was entitled to a hearing on the 
issue of his fitness as a parent before he could be deprived of his children. Id. 
57 Id. at 655. 
58 Id. at 651. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 658 (concluding that “Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a 
hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody”). 
61 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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right.65  A parent’s right to custody is a powerful interest that can 
only be terminated with clear and convincing proof that the 
parent is unfit.66  The clear and convincing evidence standard 
aims to protect fundamental fairness by minimizing the risk of 
erroneous decisions and providing litigants with a means of 
estimating risk of error.67  Therefore, even though the Court 
recognized that parental rights are not without limitations,68 
Santosky fortified the boundaries of parental rights, and limited 
the state’s authority to impose on those rights. 
B. A State Cannot Deprive Parents of Their Fundamental Right 
Without a Compelling Justification 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall 
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”69  The Supreme Court has long recognized that 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides 
heightened protection against government interference with 
fundamental liberty interests.70  The Due Process Clause does not 
permit a state to infringe on the fundamental right of parents 
“simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be 
made.”71  The state must demonstrate that deprivation of the 
right in question is necessary to accomplish a compelling state 
interest,72 and that there is no less restrictive method of 
protecting that interest.73 
A parent’s right to the care, custody, and control of his or her 
child is so fundamental that nothing short of a detrimental 
impact on the child’s well-being could trump the parent’s 
fundamental right.  A heightened level of scrutiny must be 
applied in all cases considering any sort of infringement on 
 
65 See id. at 758. 
66 See id. at 747–48. 
67 See id. at 757, 757 n.9, 767–68. 
68 The Court noted that the state has “a parens patriae interest in preserving 
and promoting the welfare of the child.” Id. at 766. 
69 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
70 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (explaining that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause not only guarantees fair process, it 
includes a substantive component that requires heightened protection against 
government interference with an individual’s fundamental rights and liberty 
interests). 
71 Id. at 72–73. 
72 See supra note 14. 
73 See supra note 15. 
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fundamental parental rights.  The Court demonstrated the 
importance of parental rights in Troxel v. Granville, where it 
found that even a limited infringement involving a close 
relative’s right to visit with a child does not overcome the 
parent’s fundamental decision-making right without a compelling 
justification.74  In Troxel, a case involving a dispute between a 
mother and her daughters’ paternal grandparents who were 
seeking visitation,75 the Court found that a Washington State law 
granting grandparents visitation rights was unconstitutional as 
applied to the facts of the case.76  In finding that the Washington 
superior court improperly awarded visitation to the children’s 
grandparents, the Court reasoned that the visitation order was 
“not founded on any special factors that might justify the State’s 
interference with [the mother’s] fundamental right to make 
decisions concerning the rearing of her two daughters.”77  The 
superior court, instead of attributing any weight to the mother’s 
position that visitation was not in her children’s best interests,78 
based its decision on two “slender findings” regarding the 
potential—and far-fetched—benefits the grandparents may 
provide in the “areas of cousins and music.”79  The superior court 
even considered the judge’s own personal experiences growing up 
and “spend[ing] . . . a week with one set of grandparents and 
[then] another set of grandparents.”80  However, two slender 
findings in support of visitation and a judge’s own childhood 
experiences visiting her grandparents, without any consideration 
 
74 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63. 
75 Id. at 60–61. The grandparents petitioned for visitation soon after the death 
of their son—the children’s father. Id. 
76 Id. at 73 (finding that because the Washington statute did not place any 
limits on the persons who may petition for visitation or the circumstances in which 
the petition may be granted, the statute was unconstitutional). The Washington 
statute provided: “Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time 
including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation 
rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child 
whether or not there has been any change of circumstances. ” Id. at 61 (citing WASH. 
REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994)). The statute does not require that a court accord a 
parent’s decision any weight whatsoever. Id. at 67. On the other hand, the statute 
“places the best-interest determination solely in the hands of the judge.” Id. 
77 Id. at 68. 
78 See id. at 72. 
79 Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 70a, In re Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (No. 99-
138), 1999 WL 35032656, at *70a). 
80 Id. (quoting Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 220–21, In Re Troxel, No. 
933006507 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 19, 1994)). 
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of the fit custodial parent’s admonition, proved to be insufficient 
state interests to infringe on the mother’s right to the care, 
custody, and control of her daughters.81 
In contrast, the Court has found a compelling justification to 
abridge parental rights when issues have arisen concerning a 
child’s well-being.  A state “is not without constitutional control 
over parental discretion in dealing with children when their 
physical or mental health is jeopardized.”82  A state may burden 
the childrearing right of parents to protect the physical, mental, 
and emotional health of children.  For example, in Prince v. 
Massachusetts, the Court recognized that a state could require a 
compulsory vaccination for a child in order to protect the child’s 
health and safeguard the child from exposure to some 
communicable disease.83  When balancing the state’s interests 
against the rights at stake, it is evident that there is certainly a 
“powerful countervailing interest”84 for the state to protect a child 
from an apparent and substantial detriment to the child’s health 
and well-being.  But, as stressed in the Court’s opinion in 
Santosky, there is a difference between a parent that is not per se 
a “model parent” and a parent that is unfit and may be 
detrimental to the child’s well-being.85  The Court has never 
construed the state’s power to include the authority to infringe on 
a parent’s right when the parent has demonstrated sufficient  
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 See id. at 75. 
82 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 233–34 (1972) (finding that the power of a parent to raise his or her child 
may be subject to limitation if it appears that the parent’s decisions “will jeopardize 
the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens”). 
83 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (explaining that even a parent’s freedom of 
conscience and religious practice claim does not nullify a state’s right to intervene 
and protect the child’s health); see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–
67 (1878) (holding that the family is not beyond regulations in the public interest 
against a claim of religious liberty); see, e.g., Wright v. DeWitt Sch. Dist. No. 1, 385 
S.W.2d 644, 645–46 (1965) (finding that the plaintiffs, members of a religious 
organization, did not have a right to resist on religious grounds the enforcement of a 
health care regulation that required all children to be vaccinated against smallpox 
before attending the defendant’s school). 
84 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
85 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
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commitment to his or her child’s well-being, regardless if the 
court does or does not necessarily agree with the parent’s 
parenting decisions.86 
The state may also take certain measures to ensure that 
other aspects of a child’s well-being, aside from health, are 
adequately provided for.  In order “to guard the general interest 
in youth’s well being, the state . . . may restrict the parent’s 
control by requiring school attendance [and] regulating or 
prohibiting the child’s labor.”87  The state has a highly ranked 
interest in educating its citizens and, accordingly, can impose 
reasonable regulations for the control of basic education.88  That 
being said, even the state’s paramount responsibility of educating 
its citizens has been “made to yield to the right of parents” to 
enroll their children in privately-operated schools if they so 
choose.89  A parent’s right to engage in the rearing of his or her 
child, specifically “the values of parental direction of the religious 
upbringing and education of their children,” continues to 
maintain a high place in our society even relative to a state’s 
compelling interests.90 
II. NEW YORK’S “BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD” RULE DEFINED 
The “best interests of the child” rule is both codified in New 
York statute and expanded upon in New York case law.  The 
“best interests of the child” standard gained prominence in New 
York in 1925 following Judge Cardozo’s pioneering custody 
opinion in Finlay v. Finlay,91 but became the “focal point” of 
custody disputes in 1962 when Domestic Relations Law §240 was 
enacted.92  Today, section 240 governs the way custody should be 
 
86 See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990) (“A natural parent 
who has demonstrated sufficient commitment to his or her children is thereafter 
entitled to raise the children free from undue state interference.”). 
87 Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. The Prince Court upheld a state statute limiting child 
labor, despite claims that the state could not exercise control over child labor 
because of constitutionally protected parental authority. See id. at 168–70. 
88 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972). 
89 Id. (discussing the Court’s holding in Pierce). 
90 See id. at 213–14. However important a state’s interest is in universal 
education, it is not “free from a balancing process” when it impinges on the 
traditional interests of parents to engage in the upbringing of their own. See id. at 
214. 
91 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925). 
92 See Joel R. Brandes, Judging the “Best Interests of the Child”, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 
23, 1999, at 3. 
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decided in all cases.93  The statute states that a court shall “enter 
orders for custody . . . in the court’s discretion . . . having regard 
to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties and 
to the best interests of the child.”94  Although the statute requires 
courts to consider both the circumstances of the case and the 
parties involved, courts have latched on to the “best interests of 
the child” requirement, and, currently, the “best interests of the 
child” has become the sole overriding criterion cited in custody 
decisions.95 
Section 240 does not on its own offer much detail as to “best 
interests of the child” test.  The statute only makes it clear that a 
determination of custody is in the judge’s sole discretion.96  The 
statute provides no direction as to how a judge should or should 
not exercise his or her discretion aside from requiring the judge 
to consider the child’s best interests.97  Therefore, most custody 
decisions rely on case law in trying to resolve how to decide 
custody.98 
Over the years, New York courts have attempted to come up 
with some general recommendations on how to evaluate the best 
interests of the child.  Not steadfast rules, these 
 
93 Section 240 and section 651 of the Family Court Act dictate the rules of 
custody disputes in New York; however, section 240 actually articulates the 
standard in custody cases. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 651(a)–(b) (West, Westlaw 
through L.2011, chs. 1–54, 57–495). 
94 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (West, Westlaw through L.2010). 
95 See Brandes, supra note 92 (“As we enter the 21st century, the ‘best interests’ 
of the child is the sole criterion for initial and modified custody awards.”); see also 
Mohen v. Mohen, 53 A.D.3d 471, 472–73, 862 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (2d Dep’t 2008) 
(stating that “[t]he essential consideration in making an award of custody is the best 
interests of the child”). 
96 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a); see also Custody and Visitation, supra 
note 19. 
97 By statutory mandate, however, a court must consider the effect of domestic 
violence upon the best interests of the child if a party makes a sworn allegation that 
“the other party has committed an act of domestic violence against the party making 
the allegation or a family or household member of either party . . . and such 
allegations are proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 
§ 240(1)(a). But even when there are allegations of domestic violence, the statute 
simply instructs that the court must consider “the effect of such domestic violence 
upon the best interests of the child.” Id. The statute on its face, once again, does not 
set forth any guidelines instructing how or to what extent a judge should consider 
the domestic violence. 
98 Developments in the Law—The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
1156, 1327 (1980) (noting that states rely on case-by-case adjudication to give 
content to the “best interests of the child” standard) [hereinafter Child Custody 
Relations]. 
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recommendations are continuously modified, expanded, and even 
narrowed as custody decisions continue to unfold.99  Currently, 
the only set-in-stone rule evident in custody cases is that the 
court is the ultimate arbiter of what custody arrangement is in 
the child’s best interests.100  Courts, acting under the doctrine of 
parens patriae, are supposed to decide what is best for each 
child.101  Judges, fully aware of the latitude they enjoy, know that 
it is ultimately up to them to say what is in the child’s best 
interest and what is not. 
The judicially created recommendations consist of a number 
of non-binding policies designed to guide judges in determining 
what would best promote the child’s interests.102  There are “no 
absolutes” in applying these recommendations; judges must 
make use of the recommended factors as they see fit.103  These 
factors include, but are not limited to, the quality of the home 
environment, the ability of each parent to provide for the child’s 
emotional and intellectual development, the financial status and 
ability of each parent to provide for the child, the relative fitness 
of the respective parents, the effect an award of custody might 
have on the child’s relationship with the other parent, the length 
of time the present custody arrangement has been in effect, and 
the desires of the child.104 
 
99 See Custody and Visitation, supra note 19 (explaining that “the caselaw 
criteria are not arbitrary and inflexible rules; they are matters to be considered, not 
matters to be blindly followed”). 
100 See, e.g., Vann v. Vann, 14 A.D.3d 710, 710–11, 789 N.Y.S.2d 261, 262 (2d 
Dep’t 2005) (stating that “[c]ustody determinations are ordinarily a matter of 
discretion for the hearing court” and that the court’s “paramount concern” is the best 
interests of the child) (citations omitted); Zafran v. Zafran, 306 A.D.2d 468, 469, 761 
N.Y.S.2d 317, 319 (2d Dep’t 2003) (“In child custody determinations, a court must 
decide what is in the best interest of the child, and what will best promote his or her 
welfare and happiness.”). 
101 See Alan D. Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70, 
at 7 (West, Westlaw through L.1988). 
102 See Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1262, 451 
N.Y.S.2d 658, 660 (1982) (confirming that the “best interests” factors are “policies 
designed not to bind the courts, but to guide them”). 
103 Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 93, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767, 447 
N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1982). 
104 See Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d at 172–73, 436 N.E.2d at 1263, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 
661–62; see also Mohen v. Mohen, 53 A.D.3d 471, 473, 862 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77–78 (2d 
Dep’t 2008) (quoting Kaplan v. Kaplan, 21 A.D.3d 993, 994–95, 801 N.Y.S.2d 391, 
393 (2d Dep’t 2005)); Kaczor v. Kaczor, 12 A.D.3d 956, 958, 785 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 
(3d Dep’t 2004) (quoting Smith v. Miller, 4 A.D.3d 697, 698, 772 N.Y.S.2d 742, 744 
(3d Dep’t 2004)); Zafran, 306 A.D.2d at 469, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 319. 
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Judges, who have been left to decide the extent to which the 
existence or absence of a particular “best interests” factor will 
affect their decision, can liberally apply these factors when 
determining custody.  In Nehra v. Uhlar, the New York Court of 
Appeals, holding that a de facto change in custody was not a 
“sufficiently extraordinary [circumstance] to justify upsetting” a 
prior judgment of custody,105 was “at pains” trying to make sense 
of the actual application of the different “best interests” 
considerations.106  Although this case involved a unique set of 
facts in which the mother requested a change in custody after she 
had abducted the children from the custodial father and 
persisted to limit any contact between the father and his children 
for four-and-a-half years,107 the court’s decision to change the 
prior custody arrangement was still purportedly based on what 
would be in the best interests of the children.108  The court made 
evident the leniency of actually applying the “best interests” 
factors.  For every “best interests” factor that was mentioned, the 
court carved out some condition to it.  Specifically, the court 
found that stability is important,109 but the disruption of change 
is not necessarily determinative.110  The desires of a child are to 
be considered, but these desires can be manipulated by the 
parents and may not necessarily be in the child’s best interests.111  
If there is a prior custody arrangement, the court explained that 
“[p]riority, not as an absolute but as a weighty factor, should, in 
the absence of extraordinary circumstances, be accorded to the 
first” award of custody or the prior agreement of custody.112  
Further, the relative fitness of the parents and the length of time  
 
 
105 43 N.Y.2d 242, 250, 372 N.E.2d 4, 8, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168, 172 (1977). 
106 Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d at 94, 432 N.E.2d at 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895 
(acknowledging the difficulty the Court of Appeals in Nehra was having trying to 
point out the factors that need to be considered and the weight or priority that 
should be attributed to each factor). 
107 See Nehra, 43 N.Y.2d at 246–47, 372 N.E.2d at 6, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 170 (1977). 
108 See id. at 246, 372 N.E.2d at 5, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 169. 
109 See id. at 250, 372 N.E.2d at 8, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 172 (explaining that in order 
to maintain a child’s stability, “continual shifting of custody from one parent to 
another is to be avoided when possible”). 
110 Id. at 248, 372 N.E.2d at 7, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 171 (reasoning that temporary 
disruption to a child’s stability because of a change in custody is not determinative 
because all changes in custody are disruptive). 
111 See id. at 249, 372 N.E.2d at 7, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 171. 
112 Id. at 251, 372 N.E.2d at 9, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 173. 
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of the present custody arrangement may also be considered.113  
Evidently, the weight of each factor is decided on a case-by-case 
basis and determined by the presiding judge. 
On appeal, the appellate court must consider the totality of 
the circumstances in deciding whether to affirm or reverse a trial 
court’s determination of what is in the best interest of the 
child.114  As a general rule, the existence or absence of any one 
factor is not determinative.115  A trial court’s determination will 
only be set aside if it lacks a sound and substantial basis.116  Such 
a strict standard of review is justified by the hearing court’s 
supposed ability to make the best determination of the child’s 
best interests because it had the opportunity to assess the 
evidence, “the credibility of the witnesses and . . . the character, 
temperament, and sincerity of the parties.”117  Accordingly, 
appellate courts must place an undue emphasis on what a lower 
court determines is in the best interest of the child, effectively 
furnishing trial courts with much broader authority in custody 
matters.118 
 
113 See id. at 250–51, 372 N.E.2d at 8, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 172–73. 
114 See Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 174, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1264, 451 
N.Y.S.2d 658, 662 (1982) (noting that on appeal a court must consider the totality of 
the circumstances rather than the existence or absence of a particular “best 
interests” factor). 
115 See Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 93–94, 432 N.E.2d 765, 
767, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1982) (instructing that no one factor can be 
determinative of whether there should be a change in custody); see also Eschbach, 56 
N.Y.2d at 173, 436 N.E.2d at 1263, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 661; Zafran v. Zafran, 306 
A.D.2d 468, 469, 761 N.Y.S.2d 317, 319 (2d Dep’t 2003). 
116 See John Robert P. v. Vito, 23 A.D.3d 659, 661, 804 N.Y.S.2d 802, 804 (2d 
Dep’t 2005); Willis-Marsh v. Wilkerson, 22 A.D.3d 977, 978, 803 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 
(3d Dep’t 2005); Zafran, 306 A.D.2d at 469, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 319 (quoting 
Vinciguerra v. Vinciguerra, 294 A.D.2d 565, 566, 743 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (2d Dep’t 
2002)). 
117 Gilmartin v. Abbas, 60 A.D.3d 1058, 1058, 877 N.Y.S.2d 347, 348 (2d Dep’t 
2009). See also, e.g., Timosa v. Chase, 21 A.D.3d 1115, 1116, 803 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576 
(2d Dep’t 2005) (claiming that an accurate evaluation of the parties can best be made 
by the trial court which has direct access to the parties and the ability to supplement 
the information with whatever is necessary). 
118 But cf. Anson v. Anson, 20 A.D.3d 603, 604, 798 N.Y.S.2d 185, 187 (3d Dep’t 
2005) (claiming that in custody matters the Appellate Division’s authority is just as 
broad as the trial court’s); Miller v. Pipia, 297 A.D.2d 362, 364, 746 N.Y.S.2d 729, 
731 (2d Dep’t 2002) (quoting Rosiana C. v. Pierre S., 191 A.D.2d 432, 433, 594 
N.Y.S.2d 316, 317 (2d Dep’t 1993)). 
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III. HOW THE “BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD” RULE REALLY 
WORKS 
The “best interests of the child” rule is a rule easily stated 
but much harder applied.  A rule with no absolutes brings with it 
a considerable amount of indeterminacy.  The Legislature’s 
intent in imposing such a broad standard was so that custody 
could be determined according to the unique circumstances and 
parties in each individual case.119  The Legislature may have 
hoped that this broad standard would be applied in a more 
particularized form, but New York’s current “best interests of the 
child” rule has great potential to shy away from the kind of 
“individualized justice that the system purports to deliver.”120 
 
119 See Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d at 93, 432 N.E.2d at 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895; 
see also Glendon, supra note 20, at 1167 (“Family law . . . is characterized by more 
discretion than any other field of private law. This fact is typically explained by a 
perceived need to tailor legal resolutions to the unique circumstances of each 
individual and family.”). However, contrary to the Legislature’s implication, the 
unique circumstances of each individual case could still be catered to with a less 
arbitrary and indeterminate standard that relies on judges to discern how the “best 
interests of the child” should be decided. The “child’s preference” factor, for example, 
has “the appropriate mix of fixed and discretionary rules.” Id. at 1172. Courts have 
been instructed to consider the desires and preferences of each child before deciding 
custody. See Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d at 173, 436 N.E.2d at 1263, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 661. 
But, like the other “best interests” factors, the child’s preferences should not be 
considered determinative. See Reed v. Reed, 189 Misc.2d 734, 738, 734 N.Y.S.2d 806, 
809 (Sup. Ct. Richmond Cnty. 2001). When weighing the child’s preferences, “the 
court must consider the age and maturity of the child and the potential for influence 
having been exerted on the child.” Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d at 173, 436 N.E.2d at 1263–
64, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 662; see also Cornell v. Cornell, 8 A.D.3d 718, 719, 778 N.Y.S.2d 
193, 195 (3d Dep’t 2004) (noting that the advanced age of a child tends to render 
greater weight to the child’s reasoned wishes). The court should be conscious of the 
fact that the desires of children are capable of distortive manipulation by a parent. 
See Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 249, 372 N.E.2d 4, 7, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168, 171 
(1977). Even with these limited guidelines a judge can better tailor custody outcomes 
to individual situations while adhering to fixed rules of “best interests” 
considerations. 
120 Julie E. Artis, Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges’ Accounts of the 
Tender Years Doctrine, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 769, 769 (2004) (quoting David M. v. 
Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 919 (W. Va. 1989)) (expressing that no decision is 
subject to more personal biases than a decision of joint custody; the decision may 
hinge on the judge’s personal experiences or the judge’s feelings towards the parties 
involved in the dispute). 
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A. The Effects of an Indeterminate Standard on a Judge’s 
Decision-Making Process 
New York’s “best interests” of the child rule has one 
fundamental flaw:  It assumes that a judge could successfully 
exercise his or her discretion in determining the best interests of 
the child in the midst of trying to resolve how to apply the “best 
interests” factors.  As a result of trying to both make sense of the 
current rule and understand the familial situation before them, 
judges’ personal biases and value judgments could creep into 
custody decisions.  Generally, a judge may incorporate personal 
inclinations in order to determine which of the recommended 
factors to consider or use his or her predispositions to resolve 
what weight to attribute to each recommended “best interests” 
factor.  This happens even more in cases in which a judge must 
determine custody between two fit parents, making the 
application of the “best interests” factors even more difficult.  
However, regardless of whether both parents are found to be fit 
or not, these issues often have the same insidious result on a 
parent’s fundamental rights. 
With these highly discretionary and imprecise rules, parents 
are unable to ascertain or predict with any level of certainty their 
“legal entitlements” to the care, custody, and control of their 
children.121  Parents have no way of knowing what they could do 
or refrain from doing that will bring them into conformity with 
what is expected under the “best interests” of the child rule.  
Moreover, parents are certainly not guaranteed that a judge’s 
decision will actually reflect their legal entitlement to their 
fundamental parental rights. 
1. Judges Choose How and What They Want To Consider 
A judge’s unbridled discretion in custody disputes, in tandem 
with the well-established rule that the “best interests” criteria 
are guides and not absolute rules, has resulted in judges 
considering some factors more than others, disregarding factors 
 
121 Marsha Garrison, Reforming Divorce: What’s Needed and What’s Not, 27 
PACE L. REV. 921, 925 (2007) (arguing that when legal rules are highly discretionary 
and imprecise, they impair an individual’s ability to determine his or her legal 
entitlements and reach mutual understanding about their entitlements). In essence, 
no one involved in the dispute can predict with certainty what “best interests” 
factors the judge will choose to consider or what weight the judge will attribute to 
each factor on any given day. 
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completely, or capriciously incorporating other considerations 
that are not part of the often-cited recommended factors.  The 
extent to which New York’s “best interests” standard allows a 
judge to exercise unrestrained discretion becomes evident after 
reading custody decisions and analyzing why a judge ruled one 
way over another.  Because neither section 240 nor case law has 
established the amount of weight that should be allotted to each 
“best interests” factor, it is not uncommon practice for judges to 
remain fixated on one factor and seemingly disregard the other 
vital considerations.122 
The Third Department specifically addressed this issue in 
Cornell v. Cornell.123  In Cornell, the Third Department reversed 
the family fourt’s improper alteration of an existing custody 
arrangement.124  The family court, “[s]uggesting that the child’s 
wishes—at the age of 15—would be dispositive,” based its 
decision solely on the child’s desire to live with his father.125  The 
lower court neither considered any evidence of the mother’s 
allegations that the father was unfit nor did it take into account 
any other “best interests” factors other than the child’s 
preferences. 
Similarly, in Chebuske v. Burnhard-Vogt, the Second 
Department found that a family court’s decision resting solely on 
the recommendations of the father’s expert witnesses lacked 
sound and substantial basis in the record.126  The family court 
placed “undue emphasis” on the recommendations of the father’s 
expert witnesses who did not evaluate anything other than the 
father’s fitness to serve as a custodial parent.127  Although in 
Chebuske the Second Department recognized the lower court’s 
unjustified emphasis on the father’s experts, too much deference 
is often paid to lower court decisions based on the theory that 
 
122 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Guerra, 28 A.D.3d 775, 813 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep’t 
2006) (reversing a family court decision that was based on the father’s work 
schedule and did not take into consideration the child’s living situation with the 
father’s parents, the separation of the child from her sisters, or the allegations of 
domestic violence); Miller v. Pipia, 297 A.D.2d 362, 364–65, 746 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731–
32 (2d Dep’t 2002) (noting that the lower court did not credit any weight to the court-
appointed expert’s evaluation of the parents, even though expert opinions are a 
factor that should be considered in making custody determinations). 
123 8 A.D.3d 718, 778 N.Y.S.2d 193 (3d Dep’t 2004). 
124 Id. at 719–20, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 195–96. 
125 Id. at 719, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 195. 
126 284 A.D.2d 456, 457–58, 726 N.Y.S.2d 697, 699 (2d Dep’t 2001). 
127 Id. at 458, 726 N.Y.S.2d at 699. 
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these courts could and will thoroughly evaluate the character of 
the parties and the individual circumstances of each case.128  In 
reality, courts, like the family courts in Cornell and Chebuske, 
are allocating whatever weight the judge sees fit to each vital 
consideration and “improperly disregard[ing] the unequivocal 
conclusions” that should have been drawn if the cases were 
properly considered.129 
The gaps in the “best interests” rule have also made custody 
decisions pliable to a trial judge’s every inclination to take into 
account factors beyond the recommended “best interests” 
considerations, including a parent’s race, gender, sexual 
orientation, and religion.130  Custody decisions that consider a 
parent’s race are an example of judges’ wide-ranging ability to 
incorporate whatever factors they see fit in their decisions.  
Although not one of the often-cited factors, race has become a 
quasi-factor that could be considered in determining what is in 
the child’s best interests.131  Given the fact that judges resort to 
the “best interests” criteria developed “through . . . litigation of 
countless custody matters,”132 judges have blindly adopted race as 
a factor without any regard to the constitutional issues that may 
come attached. 
As a “general rule,” New York courts have confirmed that a 
judge may consider race in a dispute between biological parents 
“for custody of an interracial child.”133  Although courts have 
stated that race is not a controlling factor that could outweigh all 
other considerations,134 it is not clear how or to what extent a 
parent’s race should be considered.135  Judges who decide to take 
 
128 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
129 Chebuske, 284 A.D.2d at 457, 726 N.Y.S.2d at 699. 
130 See Child Custody Relations, supra note 98, at 1338–45 for a discussion on 
how factors unrelated to a state’s compelling interests, including race, religion, and 
parental sexual habits, may form the basis of custody awards. 
131 See Farmer v. Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d 137, 143–46, 439 N.Y.S.2d 584, 587–89 
(Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 1981). Under the equal protection doctrine, however, the 
explicit use of racial criteria is subject to the strictest of scrutiny requiring a 
compelling state objective. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (citing 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
132 Custody and Visitation, supra note 19. 
133 Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d at 144–46, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 588–89. 
134 See id. at 145, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 588 (quoting Fountaine v. Fountaine, 133 
N.E.2d 532, 534–35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956)). 
135 See Matter of Astonn H., Infant, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 1, 1995, at 33, col. 4 (Family 
Ct. Kings Cnty.) (admitting that the court found “no cases that specifically address 
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a parent’s race into account must draw speculative conclusions 
regarding interracial relationships and may award custody to one 
parent over the other not based on a “best interests” guideline 
but, rather, based on the way they perceive the situation to be. 
A parent who has not necessarily done anything wrong in 
the past and would not be detrimental to the child’s future 
development may be denied his or her fundamental right based 
on a judge’s perception of a future interracial custodial 
relationship.  When dealing with racial issues, however, there 
will not necessarily be specific past events that will aid in 
predicting which parent will better serve the child’s best 
interests.  Judges draw generalized conclusions on how a child’s 
race will affect the child in a certain number of years from now, 
in fear that a child will not be able to identify with a parent of 
the opposite race,136 or that a child will maintain one parent’s 
racial identity over the other.137  But, “[g]eneralized assertions 
based upon vague fears or even upon speculative probabilities 
about the consequences of racial integration do not meet the 
heavy burden of justification placed on the state when it employs 
a racial classification.”138  In fact, general assertions about a 
child’s welfare based on any one of a judge’s inclinations are not 
sufficient to justify infringing on any fundamental right.139  
Nonetheless, it does not appear as if the constitutional rights of 
parents are even remotely considered when a judge chooses to 
slip in race as a “best interests” consideration and decides 
custody on a prediction of the future rather than on a parent’s 
fitness. 
 
the issue of race”; however, the court still considered race as one of the many factors 
in determining custody). 
136 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 240 A.D.2d 928, 929, 658 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (3d 
Dep’t 1997) (presuming that a child would not be denied his “biracial identity” by 
living with his white mother rather than his African-American father because the 
father would be entitled to “liberal visitation”); Olivier A. v. Christina A., 9 Misc. 3d 
1104(A), 806 N.Y.S.2d 446 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. 2005) (acknowledging that race 
must be considered in order to fulfill the child’s need to maintain his “cultural 
heritage and identity”). 
137 See, e.g., Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d at 147, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 589–90 (considering 
and ultimately rejecting, the father’s contention that, as the colored parent, he 
should be awarded custody because society will perceive the child to be black). 
138 Child Custody Relations, supra note 98, at 1341–42. 
139 See supra Part I.B. for a discussion on the level of justification required to 
infringe on a parent’s fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his or 
her child. 
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2. Judge’s Use of Discretion When Neither Parent Is Found To 
Be Unfit 
Personal biases and value judgments are most evident in 
decisions in which both parents are found to be fit parents yet 
the judge still chooses to award exclusive custody to one parent.  
When faced with more than one fit parent, “a prediction of which 
claimant would be most likely to provide what is best for the 
child is extremely difficult to make.”140  Courts will often inject 
their subjective judgments concerning the “best interests” factors 
in order to overcome this hurdle.  But these are the 
circumstances where personal value judgments and biases 
should be the least evident.  If a court has found both parents to 
be fit, then neither parent should be deprived of his or her 
custodial right, especially if not based on strict “best interests” 
considerations. 
The King’s County Supreme Court in Finkelstein v. 
Finkelstein, was faced with two fit parents during a custody 
dispute involving a child diagnosed with Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder and Asperger’s Syndrome.141  The court 
acknowledged the fact that “[b]oth parties are fit parents” and 
“[e]ach demonstrates a loving, caring attitude towards [the 
child],”142 yet still awarded sole custody to the mother.  The court 
seemed to have accredited its determination completely on the 
child’s stability.143  While stability may be of paramount concern 
when considering the custody of a special needs child, this does 
not mean that other factors, such as each parent’s ability to 
provide for the child’s emotional and intellectual development, 
should be ignored.  By granting sole custody to the mother, the 
court restricted the father’s involvement in making decisions 
concerning the child’s well-being and development.  The father 
specifically argued that the boy was going to need his father “on a 
regular basis” in the future, especially when the circumstances  
 
 
 
 
140 Robinson, supra note 14, at 59. 
141 N.Y. L.J., May. 18, 1998, at 33, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1998). 
142 Id. 
143 See id. (focusing on the law guardian’s recommendation that sole custody to 
the mother would better serve the child’s stability). 
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became “more difficult.”144  The court, however, did not even 
address the beneficial role the father, a responsible parent aware 
of the care his son required,145 could play in his child’s life. 
Similarly, in Chase v. Matanda-Chase, the Second 
Department precisely found that “neither parent [was] unfit and 
either would provide the child with a comfortable and loving 
home,” but still affirmed the lower court’s decision granting the 
father sole custody of the child.146  The court also put complete 
emphasis on the child’s stability, without considering any of the 
other recommended “best interests” factors.147  Holding that it 
was not in the child’s best interest to disrupt his five-year living 
arrangement with his father, the court took no consideration of 
how the custody arrangement had and would affect the child’s 
relationship with the mother, the quality of the father’s home 
environment, or even the ability of the father to provide for the 
child’s emotional and intellectual development.148  One would 
think that where the court predominately based its decision on 
the fact that the child was living with his father for five years, it 
would evaluate the quality of the father’s home environment 
throughout those years.  The judge, however, remained fixated 
on the child’s stability and justified the decision entirely on this 
single consideration, without warranting the “fit” and “loving” 
mother the due consideration she was entitled to. 
In both Finkelstein and Chase, the courts did not consider 
any other option other than sole custody,149 regardless of the fact 
that neither parent was found to be unfit.  The courts could have 
maintained stability by awarding joint legal custody with 
primary physical custody to one parent.  Both fit parents would 
have decision-making authority, but the child’s primary 
residence would be with one parent in order to preserve the 
child’s stability.  In spite of both parents’ fitness, the courts 
mentioned no alternative to sole custody as if the non-custodial 
parent was unfit and a detriment to the child. 
 
144 Id. 
145 Id. The court ignored the father’s concerns about the child needing his father 
in the future and just proceeded to consider the animosity between the parents. 
146 41 A.D.3d 475, 475, 837 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320–21 (2d Dep’t 2007). 
147 See id. at 475–76, 837 N.Y.S.2d at 320–21. 
148 See id. 
149 See id.; Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, N.Y. L.J., May. 18, 1998, at 33, col. 4 (Sup. 
Ct. Kings County 1998). 
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The problem with taking away a fit parent’s custodial right 
goes far beyond a judge’s discretion to consider some factors and 
not others.  Given the heightened level of scrutiny required in 
taking away a parent’s fundamental right, a judge must find that 
joint custody would be harmful to the child in order to justify sole 
custody.150  It is irrational that a court could find both that a 
parent is fit and that the same parent’s involvement in the child’s 
upbringing would be a detriment to the child to justify truncating 
his or her custodial right.151  As noted by the Supreme Court  
in Hodgson v. Minnesota, where the Court declared 
unconstitutional a Minnesota statute that prohibited abortions to 
women under the age of eighteen until forty-eight hours after 
both of her parents were notified, a parent “who has 
demonstrated sufficient commitment to his or her child[] is 
thereafter entitled to raise the child[] free from undue state 
interference.”152  Anything contrary to that is certainly at odds 
with the Supreme Court’s inveterate presumption that “parents 
act in their children’s best interests.”153  When a court decides to 
take a fit parent’s custodial right away, the court is assuming 
that any other finding the court makes is enough to rebut the 
Supreme Court’s presumption that parents act in furtherance of 
their child’s best interests.  Moreover, courts are forgetting that a 
custody decision is not an “award” to one parent; it is a 
deprivation of a fundamental right to someone that was entitled 
to that right all along. 
3. Lack of Relief on Appeal 
The amount of deference appellate courts pay to lower court 
custody decisions only acts to increase the chances that a 
parent’s fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his 
 
150 See supra Part I.B for a discussion about how the constitution mandates a 
finding that joint custody would be detrimental or harmful to the child before 
granting exclusive legal custody to one parent and taking away the other parent’s 
right to engage in the upbringing of his or her child. 
151 In fact, the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois recognized that “the State 
registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the 
custody of fit parents.” 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972). 
152 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990). Simply because the parents’ decisions are not 
agreeable does not automatically transfer from the parent to the state the power to 
make decisions concerning the child. See id. at 484–85 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
153 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000) (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 
U.S. 584, 602 (1979)); Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. 
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or her child will be invalidly infringed upon.  A trial court’s 
custody determination will not be set aside unless it lacks a 
sound and substantial basis on the record.154  Unlike other 
appellate standards, courts considering an appeal from a prior 
custody order must determine the substantiality of a lower 
court’s decision without any objective scrutiny governing how 
custody decisions should have been decided in the first place.  A 
trial judge, therefore, can allocate custody in whatever 
arrangement he or she sees fit and that arrangement will only be 
reversed if a parent has the ability to appeal, appeal is granted, 
and the appellate court, without concrete criteria to evaluate the 
lower court’s decision, finds that the judge arranged custody 
without any substantial basis. 
The presumption that only trial courts have the ability to 
adequately evaluate the circumstances and parties of a case is an 
extremely difficult hurdle to overcome on appeal.  The court in 
Chebuske v. Burnhard-Vogt shed light on the extent to which a 
lower court must err for a decision to be overturned on appeal.155  
In Chebuske, the Second Department properly took issue with 
the fact that the family court completely disregarded the 
conclusions and recommendations of a court appointed forensic 
examiner, “the only disinterested party” in the case, and placed 
undue emphasis on the father’s expert witness’s unfounded 
recommendations when deciding to grant exclusive custody to the 
father.156  Apparently, a lower court’s complete disregard of 
conclusions and recommendations and its undue emphasis on the 
unfounded conclusions is the degree of error required for a 
custody decision to be overturned.157  Appellate judges essentially 
must be reluctant to second-guess a trial court’s custody decision  
 
 
 
 
 
154 See supra Part II for a discussion about the amount of deference appellate 
courts should pay to trial court custody decisions. 
155 284 A.D.2d 456, 726 N.Y.S.2d 697 (2d Dep’t 2001). 
156 Id. at 457–58, 726 N.Y.S.2d at 699. 
157 An appellate court, generally, cannot reverse a lower court’s custody decision 
unless the lower court has exercised its discretion based on “some wrong general 
principle or taken an inappropriate factor into account.” Robert H. Mnookin, Child-
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 254 (1975). 
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unless something completely outrageous appears in the record; 
they must consider an appeal with the mindset that the lower 
court rightfully decided custody.158 
Lower court judges, however, rely on case-by-case 
adjudication to give content to the “best interests” standard.  
Therefore, as illustrated by the courts’ yielding adoption of race 
as a “best interests” consideration,159 there are minimal 
justifications for appellate relief based on the fact that a trial 
judge exceeded his or her authority.160  On appeal, a court is not 
even justified to reverse a custody decision on the grounds that 
any one factor was not considered.161  The ill-defined “best 
interests” standard ultimately functions to protect custody 
decisions from being overturned on appeal.  As a matter of fact, 
judges have even acknowledged this protection and have used it 
to justify custody decisions based on factors other than the child’s 
best interests.162 
B. The Effects of a Broken System on Determining What Is in 
the Best Interests of the Child 
All the problems associated with the “best interests” rule—
its intrinsic vagueness, its lack of definite considerations, and its 
susceptibility to personal biases—are further exacerbated by the 
 
158 See Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 173, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1264, 451 
N.Y.S.2d 658, 662 (1982) (requiring that appellate courts be “reluctant to substitute 
their own evaluation of [the] subjective factors” for that of the trial court). “In 
matters of this character the findings of the nisi prius court must be accorded the 
greatest respect.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re Irene O., 38 
N.Y.2d 776, 777, 345 N.E.2d 337, 337, 381 N.Y.S.2d 865, 865 (1975)). 
159 See supra Part III.A.1. 
160 See Child Custody Relations, supra note 98, at 1327–28 (suggesting that one 
of the limited justifications for intervention on the ground that the state exceeded its 
parens patriae power is “when custody is awarded on the basis of a factor that is 
suspect for special reasons—for example, the gender or race of the parent”); see also 
Mnookin, supra note 157, at 250–54 (suggesting that because the “best interests” 
standard depends on “person-oriented” rather than on “act-oriented” determinations, 
on predictions rather than past events, and on interdependent factors, appellate 
review is sharply limited). 
161 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
162 See Artis, supra note 120, at 791 (noting that only a few judges find “best 
interests” criteria useful, but that several judges use the criteria as a tool to justify 
their custody decisions). One judge inadvertently admitted to being able to find facts 
and make them fit with the law if he has to. See id. And, similarly, another judge 
contended that judges “can do just about anything [they] want to, and if the judge 
spends a little time writing [a custody decision], whatever decision [the judge] 
make[s] will be upheld on appeal.” Id. 
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inadequacies of the New York courts that are responsible for 
resolving custody disputes.  The troublesome systemic conditions 
surrounding custody proceedings are not a secret to either the 
public or the administrators;163 the “players themselves 
acknowledge that the system often works badly or barely works 
at all.”164  This Section aims to elucidate the effects of New York’s 
court system on determining what is in the best interests of the 
child.  Specifically, this Section will address the shortcomings of 
both New York family and supreme courts, not as a 
recommendation for sweeping changes in the court systems, but 
rather to prove the realities of implementing such an unworkable 
custody standard. 
The lack of sufficient resources in both the supreme courts 
and the family courts has a damaging effect on determining what 
is in the best interests of a child.  These “regularly overcrowded” 
courts,165 with limited court resources,166 create a substantial 
obstacle for judges to efficiently and effectively determine the 
child’s best interests.  Custody decisions take a lot more time 
than required,167 judges are often reassigned in the middle,168 and 
“[t]he overlapping jurisdiction of these [two] courts often causes 
duplication and confusion, adding cost, delay and trauma to such 
proceedings.”169  As a result, judges cannot devote the necessary 
 
163 See Joe Sexton, Opening the Doors on Family Court’s Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 13, 1997, at 1. 
164 Id. 
165 Matrimonial Commission Report, supra note 28, at 1019; see also Susan R. 
Larabee, Providing Resources to Family Courts, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 24, 2003, at 2 (noting 
that in 2002, Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye reports the state’s family courts handled 
over 700,000 cases with fewer than 140 judges); Peggy Farber, Family Court Fiasco, 
GOTHAM GAZETTE, June 1, 2000, available at http://www.gothamgazette.com/ 
article/children/20000601/2/110 (“[On] a typical day at Queens Family Court . . . over 
one hundred people [are] waiting in the second floor reception area for their cases to 
be called by one of five judges holding court on that floor that day.”); Sexton, supra 
note 163 (describing one judge’s Monday morning in Kings County Family Court, 
with the day’s calendar holding fifty cases and requiring “for each case: city lawyers, 
child welfare caseworkers, parents and court-appointed lawyers”). 
166 See Matrimonial Commission Report, supra note 28, at 1019–21 (including 
inadequate courtroom space, inappropriate physical facilities, insufficient resources 
to cope with the volume and seriousness of the caseloads involved, and limited 
assistance). 
167 See, e.g., Chebuske v. Burnhard-Vogt, 284 A.D.2d 456, 457, 726 N.Y.S.2d 
697, 698 (2d Dep’t 2001) (acknowledging that the custody hearing was conducted 
over sixteen months). 
168 See Matrimonial Commission Report, supra note 28, at 1018. 
169 Id. at 1033. 
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amount of time to consider and analyze the “numerous and 
diverse” issues concerning custody disputes.170  Judges rely on 
short cuts to accelerate the process and substitute for the 
insufficient resources they are provided with.  And, if need be, 
judges—as the sole arbiters entrusted with full discretion to 
determine custody disputes—can even rely on their own 
subjective judgments to short-cut the decision-making process. 
To make matters worse, under the current administration of 
custody disputes, judges are often not offered the proper training 
and education required to make them “knowledgeable and 
experienced in the area of law.”171  As noted by the Matrimonial 
Commission, the “timely, accurate and just disposition of 
[familial dispute] cases depends, to a great degree, on the 
knowledge, character, temperament, professional aptitude and 
experience of the judge before whom the matter is presented.”172  
It is essential that a judge is “knowledgeable about statutory and 
case law” and that “he or she receive[s] a strong, basic education” 
in family law practice and the administration of a courtroom and 
case management.173  While all judges already receive extensive 
and ongoing continuing education in both the supreme and 
family courts,174 there is additional “highly specialized education 
and training” that a judge must receive.175  Without this 
specialized training, judges who have unbridled discretion at 
their fingertips may lack the guidance and experience required to  
 
 
 
170 See id. at 1019–21; see also Sexton, supra note 163 (quoting a senior Legal 
Aid lawyer in Manhattan who has reservations about the decisions family court 
judges make “based on what they see in the five seconds they look up”); John 
Sullivan, Chief Judge Announces Plan To Streamline Family Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 25, 1998, at B7 (noting that in 1997, Kings County Family Court “cases 
receive[d] an average of slightly over four minutes before a judge on the first 
appearance, and little more than 11 minutes on subsequent appearances”). 
171 Matrimonial Commission Report, supra note 28, at 1021. The Commission 
noted that while it may be desirable to assign judges who have knowledge and 
experience in the area of law, “the realities of judicial administration do not always 
make this possible.” Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 1021–22. 
174 See id. at 1022. 
175 Id. The Commission has recommended that a new judge receive an 
expanded, four-week education program including a course in “substantive and 
procedural law” and a week spent integrating and transitioning into his or her 
respective district. Id. at 1023. 
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exercise that discretion in the child’s best interests.  This imposes 
a risk on parents who are trying to maintain custody of their 
children. 
When cases are decided in an overcrowded and ill-equipped 
system by judges who may or may not have been properly 
trained, the only logical conclusion that follows is that these 
decisions do not always duly consider the facts of each individual 
case and the character and sincerity of the parties as purported 
by the boilerplate recitation of the “best interests” rule.  Custody 
disputes are not provided with the “close monitoring and follow-
up” they require.176  The system operates to “undermine the 
[c]ourt’s ability to fulfill its promise” and protect  parents’ 
fundamental rights.177  
IV. JOINT CUSTODY: THE BEST SOLUTION 
It is evident that there are many shortcomings in New York’s 
“best interests of the child” rule.  These issues range from the 
actual rule itself, to the system in charge of implementing the 
rule, to the circumstances under which a child’s best interests 
must be decided.  The state’s role of determining what custody 
arrangement will best promote the child’s interests is 
compromised by these issues and, as a result, so is the state’s 
right to truncate a parent’s fundamental right to the care, 
custody, and control of his or her child.  It may seem as if the 
best solution to resolve the flaws of New York’s “best interests of 
the child” rule would be to either create a clearer, more definitive 
standard, with absolute factors that must be considered, or to 
modify the workings of the courts responsible for determining 
custody; both solutions involve changes that certainly must be 
made.  This Note, however, proposes a solution that goes beyond 
simply patching up some problems.  It recommends that the best 
means of promoting both the welfare of the child and the 
protection of a parent’s fundamental right is for the Legislature 
to adopt a presumption in favor of joint custody.  Under a 
presumption of joint custody, a court would only be allowed to 
order sole custody if a joint custodial relationship would be 
detrimental to the child.  A court would not be justified in 
 
176 See id. at 1019. 
177 See Leah A. Hill, Do You See What I See? Reflections on How Bias Infiltrates 
the New York City Family Court—The Case of the Court Ordered Investigation, 40 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527, 531 (2007). 
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granting sole custody on the grounds that the parents 
demonstrated a high level of acrimony during the custody 
dispute; rather, the real concern will be whether the parents are 
capable of putting aside their differences and working together. 
A. The Presumption Defined 
A presumption in favor of joint custody would be exactly 
that:  Judges would have to presume that joint legal custody 
must be awarded to both parents unless there is a compelling 
reason why there should not be joint custody.178  Absent a 
compelling justification, both parents would maintain their 
decision-making authority over issues concerning their child’s 
upbringing.  This presumption would be in line with the Supreme 
Court’s long-standing presumption that parents act in the best 
interests of their children179 and would adequately protect a 
child’s best interests without unduly encroaching on a parent’s 
fundamental right.  It would coalesce New York’s current rule 
that there is “no prima facie right to the custody of the child in 
either parent”180 with the state’s purpose under the doctrine of 
parens patriae181 and, in effect, would operate to restrain the 
court from granting either parent the right to sole custody unless 
the state has a compelling justification to protect a child from a 
detriment or harm to the child’s health and safety. 
Absent a detriment or harm to a child, the state would not be 
justified in awarding sole custody to one parent.  Any 
justification a state might have in stripping a parent of his or her 
custodial rights stems from the “role of the state as sovereign in 
child custody determinations, when acting on behalf of 
 
178 Under this presumption, a court, recognizing that every family’s 
circumstances are unique, will have to order a joint custody arrangement conducive 
to the particular familial situation and not pigeonhole all joint custody 
arrangements. 
179 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. The initial burden would 
continue to be on the state to disprove that a parent is not acting in the child’s best 
interests. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–70 (2000). As the Court noted in 
Troxel, the weight should not be on the parent to disprove that a certain 
arrangement would not be in the best interests of his or her child. See id. at 69. 
180 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (West, Westlaw through L.1988). 
181 In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court, while discussing the state’s 
interest in terminating a parent’s custodial rights, explicitly stated that “while there 
is still reason to believe that positive, nurturing parent-child relationships exist, the 
parens patriae interest favors preservation, not severance, of natural familial 
bonds.” 455 U.S. 745, 766–67 (1982). 
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the . . . interests of a child.”182  In light of the fundamental 
interest at stake, there are “fairly tight limits on the exercise of 
the parens patriae power.”183  A state, acting under the penumbra 
of parens patriae, is only allowed to limit this right when there is 
a compelling state interest.  Specifically, where there may be 
evidence that a custodial arrangement will jeopardize the health 
or safety of the child, the doctrine of parens patriae may usurp a 
parent’s childrearing right.184 
Judges will have to be wary of factual evidence that indicates 
a potential harm to the child.  Contrary to the courts’ implication 
that the “best interests of the child” rule provides the most 
precision possible,185 evidence of specific situations that would 
actually harm a child is usually “much easier for a court to 
identify and evaluate than those factors that would result in the 
best possible environment for a child, because the probable 
harmful effects may be much more readily apparent.”186  There 
are, for example, certain obvious symptoms that a judge could 
observe and easily identify indicating whether a child is being 
provided adequate medical care and attention, adequate food, 
shelter, and clothing, and adequate parental supervision.187  
Without an overt showing of potential harm, a judge’s decision to 
truncate a parent’s right to the care, custody, and control of his 
or her child is much more speculative.  A biased weighing of “best 
interests” factors, that do not necessarily determine whether a 
parent is fit to be a custodial parent, is far from a compelling 
reason to override the joint custody presumption. 
Requiring that there be a potential detriment or harm to the 
child in order to grant exclusive legal custody to one parent is not 
a concept so far-stretched.  Many state legislatures have 
explicitly directed courts to favor joint custody.188  The Florida 
 
182 See Danice M. Kowalczyk, Lizzie’s Law: Healing the Scars of Domestic 
Murder—An Emerging National Model, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1243 n.18 (1998). 
183 Child Custody Relations, supra note 98, at 1319. 
184 See Kowalczyk, supra note 181, at 1260. 
185 See In re Adoption of J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860, 863 (D.C. 1977). 
186 Robinson, supra note 14, at 61. 
187 Id. 
188 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 1997) (mandating that an award to 
both parents be first in order of preference for custody decisions); CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 3080 (West 1993) (requiring that there is a presumption that joint custody is in the 
best interests of the child); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a (West 2005) (stating 
that “[t]here shall be a presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that joint custody 
is in the best interests of a minor child”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B (West 1994); 
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Legislature, for example, has overtly designated a presumption 
in favor of joint custody unless there is a showing of some 
detriment to the child.  The Florida statute orders “parental 
responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless 
the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be 
detrimental to the child.”189  Florida’s statute has set a strict 
requirement of detriment before a court could find that joint 
custody is inappropriate.190  The Florida courts have defined 
detriment to mean “circumstances that produce or are likely to 
produce lasting mental, physical or emotional harm.”191  
Detriment is more than “trauma caused to a child by uprooting 
him from familiar surroundings”; it “contemplates a longer term 
adverse effect that transcends the normal adjustment period.”192 
Under Florida law a parent’s right fails to evaporate merely 
because he or she has not been an ideal parent.193  Considering 
the “best interest of the child . . . does not obviate the necessity of 
a specific finding that shared parental responsibility would be 
detrimental to the child.”194  A “best interests” finding is not 
equivalent to a finding that shared parental responsibility would 
be detrimental to the child.  In Grimaldi v. Grimaldi, for 
example, a Florida District Court of Appeals in affirming a prior 
joint custody order held that finding that a mother was not 
capable of exercising parental responsibility due to an illness was 
not the same as finding that shared responsibility would be 
detrimental to the child.195  Just because a trial court assumes 
that it is in the best interests of the child for one parent to have  
 
 
 
 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (West 2003) (placing joint legal custody as first 
preference in custody decisions); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (West 2011); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 125.490 (West 1981) (stating that there is a presumption that joint 
custody is in child’s best interests); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (West 1999) (“There 
shall be a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of a child in an 
initial custody determination.”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.105 (West 2008). 
189 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2) (West 2010). 
190 See Maslow v. Edwards, 886 So.2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
191 In re Marriage of Matzen, 600 So.2d 487, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
192 Id. (citations omitted). 
193 See id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)). 
194 Maslow, 886 So.2d at 1028. 
195 721 So.2d 820, 821–22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
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primary custody, it still must make a specific finding that shared 
parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child before 
granting sole custody to one parent.196 
Similar to the Florida statute, under the proposed joint 
custody presumption, the state would be the final arbiter of 
whether there is a compelling justification to grant sole or joint 
custody.  The joint custody presumption should not be eliminated 
solely on the grounds that a parent is requesting sole custody.197  
Even if one or both parents are seeking sole custody, the court 
should still undertake the dispute with the presumption that 
joint custody should be granted.  A state can, in no way, 
eliminate the burden of proving a compelling interest based 
solely on a parent’s request.198  This is especially true because 
parents are permitted to request sole custody without presenting 
any specific reasons for rejecting joint custody or any “special 
factors that might warrant the conclusion that joint custody is 
not in the best interests of the child.”199  Absent a burden on the 
state to prove a compelling justification, a state would effectively 
be able to take away a parent’s fundamental right through a 
foregone conclusion that one parent will have their decision-
making right truncated regardless of the state’s justification for 
doing so.  Therefore, regardless of what each parent claims, a 
court must always assume the responsibility of determining 
whether there are compelling reasons to do away with the 
presumption and award sole custody to one parent. 
B. Acrimony Looked at from a Different Perspective 
The acrimony between the parents would still be a vital 
consideration in deciding whether there may be a potential 
detriment to the child and, therefore, a sufficient reason to 
 
196 See Maslow, 886 So.2d at 1028 (stating explicitly that “utilizing the best 
interest of the child standard does not obviate the necessity of a specific finding that 
shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child before awarding 
sole parental responsibility to a parent”). 
197 Granted, if a parent persists with the current “all or nothing” approach of 
custody and would rather not have any custody over his or her child than to share 
joint custody with the other parent, a court acting under the joint custody 
presumption should not impose on that parent a joint custodial arrangement. 
198 See James W. Bozzomo, Joint Legal Custody: A Parent’s Constitutional Right 
in a Reorganized Family, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 559 (2002) (stating that when 
dealing with a fundamental right, any infringement on that right imposes on the 
state the burden to show that there is a compelling justification for doing so). 
199 Id. at 570. 
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supersede the presumption in favor of joint custody.200  For joint 
legal custody to be successful, parents must be able to get along 
and communicate about issues regarding their child’s welfare.  
Judges, however, would be neither permitted nor justified in 
blindly accepting the acrimony they see before them during a 
custody dispute to rationalize granting sole legal custody.  Of real 
concern is not whether the parents’ relationship appears to be so 
discordant at the time of litigation to award sole custody, but, 
rather, whether the parents are capable of putting aside their 
differences and working together to engage in joint decision- 
making with respect to their child’s upbringing and prevent any 
foreseen detriment or harm to their child.201 
The mere fact that parents are so acrimonious during a 
custody disputes does not mean that a cooperative joint custody 
arrangement is not feasible.  The reason parents come to court to 
resolve contested custody issues may range amongst many 
different reasons.  For instance, parents who have never been 
married may seek a judicial decree to resolve the problems they 
are having over an existing custodial arrangement,202 “former 
spouses [may seek] to modify a prior child custody order,”203 or 
spouses who have filed for divorce may contest custody as a 
tangential issue of the divorce.204  Clearly, parents have some 
underlying issues between themselves before even entering the  
 
 
 
200 Currently, “joint custody is encouraged primarily as a voluntary alternative 
for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion.” 
Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 589–90, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1021, 407 N.Y.S.2d 
449, 451 (1978); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 267 A.D.2d 516, 518, 699 N.Y.S.2d 
181, 184 (3d Dep’t 1999); Trolf v. Trolf, 126 A.D.2d 544, 544, 510 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 
(2d Dep’t 1987). 
201 See Trolf, 126 A.D.2d at 544, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 667 (rationalizing that a 
judge’s real concern in deciding custody is how capable parents are of “cooperating in 
making decisions on matters relating to the care and welfare of the children”); see, 
e.g., Somerville v. Somerville, 307 A.D.2d 481, 483, 761 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (3d Dep’t 
2003) (finding that although the record reflected the “parties’ apparent disdain for 
one another,” that does not necessarily establish that the parents were so severely 
embattled that they could not communicate in reasonable fashion for their child’s 
benefit). 
202 See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 131–32. The existing custodial arrangement 
could be a modification from a past judicial decree or one that the parents have 
implemented on their own, without judicial intervention, or from an actual legal 
agreement. 
203 Id. 
204 See supra note 27. 
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courtroom; however, the embittered relationships evident during 
custody disputes are circumstances to a great extent fueled by 
the “traditional emphasis on exclusive custody” to one parent.205 
When considering whether to grant sole custody, a judge 
would need to account for the fact that the animosity evident in 
custody disputes is largely due to the “winner take all” mentality 
that has become embedded in New York custody disputes.206  The 
current system pits one parent against the other and forces them 
to battle out issues of custody.  A parent is put in the position, 
whether he or she truly believes it or not, to voice the other 
parent’s every imperfection, in hopes of persuading the court and 
gaining an advantage in the litigation.207  Parents have no 
incentive to admit to the other parent’s strengths or the benefits 
he or she can provide to the child when they have no idea how 
that admission will be considered by the court.  This “winner 
take all” frame of mind will possibly persist through a new joint 
custody presumption, ultimately making it appear as if the 
hostility between the parents is at an even higher level than it 
actually is. 
The high level of acrimony during custody proceedings, 
however, may be temporary and may likely wane as time passes.  
Parents come to court and seek judicial intervention to solve 
their impasse in order to move forward in their lives.208  It has 
been argued that “[t]he very fact that both parents want custody 
badly enough to litigate for it suggests that,” when push comes to 
shove, they may be “willing to work to minimize their conflicts 
with each other in order to retain custody.”209  The apparent 
discord between the parents during litigation may offer little 
 
205 Robinson, supra note 14, at 30. 
206 Id.; see also New York State Assembly, Memorandum in Support of 
Legislation, B. 4559, 232d Leg. (2009) (advocating for a presumption in favor of 
shared parenting of children in matrimonial proceedings because sole custody 
generates “an adversarial forum where one side defaults and the other, allowing a 
‘winner’ and a ‘loser’ to be declared”) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
LEGISLATION]; Bozzomo, supra note 198, at 578; Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 140 
(arguing that the litigation process of custody disputes “exacerbates acrimony 
between parties”). 
207 See Bozzomo, supra note 198, at 578 (stating that parents have an incentive 
to “introduce very personal and damaging evidence against the other parent” in 
order to convince the court that they should be awarded exclusive custody). 
208 See id. at 576 (“Often, the reason why couples seek judicial intervention is to 
solve the . . . problems so that they can move their lives along and end the conflict.”). 
209 Child Custody Relations, supra note 98, at 1330. 
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indication of whether “both parties are fit and loving parents, 
possess a desire to share in the upbringing of their children and 
have demonstrated a willingness and ability to set aside their 
personal differences and work together for the good of their 
children.”210  Therefore, fleeting acrimony, even if extreme, is far 
from a sufficient reason to curtail a parent’s fundamental right. 
C. Still in the Best Interests of the Child 
A presumption that absent a compelling justification a court 
should award joint custody to both parents would not only be in 
line with constitutional mandate, it would operate to preserve 
the best interests of the child.  As explained, even under a 
presumption in favor of joint custody, if joint custody would prove 
to be detrimental to a child, sole custody should and will be 
granted.  Without a potential detriment or harm, however, a joint 
custodial relationship will be in the best interests of the child. 
Shared parenting is in a child’s best interest where the 
relationship between the parents and the child is free from 
abuse, neglect, domestic violence, and other harmful 
circumstances.211  Unlike sole custody, under joint custody both 
parents have a right to engage in the upbringing of the child and 
feel as significant in the child’s life as the other “because there is 
presumably no grave disparity between [the parents] regarding 
their authority.”212  As a result, parents feel less as if they are in 
a constant battle to get the upper hand over the other parent’s 
involvement in the child’s upbringing.  Rather, parents make 
decisions and undertake the caretaking responsibility jointly.  
Both parents play a significant role in their child’s life and 
development.213  Thus, “maximiz[ing] the child’s physical and  
 
 
210 Palmer v. Palmer, 223 A.D.2d 944, 945, 637 N.Y.S.2d 225, 226 (3d Dep’t 
1996). 
211 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION, supra note 206, at 4559 
(“Shared parenting, where both parents share as equally as possible in the legal 
responsibility, living experience, and physical care of the child, has been found to be 
in child’s best interest . . . [w]here the relationship between the parent(s) and 
child(ren) is free from domestic violence, abuse, neglect and other harmful 
circumstances.”). 
212 Jo-Ellen Paradise, The Disparity Between Men and Women in Custody 
Disputes: Is Joint Custody the Answer to Everyone’s Problems?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
517, 567 (1998). 
213 Id. at 566. 
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emotional access to both parents in meaningful, day-to-day 
interaction, and help[ing] the child to see both parents as sources 
of love and security and as positive role models.”214 
Joint custody also works to maximize a child’s stability.  
When one parent is assigned sole legal custody, the other parent 
is “reduced to a peripheral ‘visitor’ status” and, as a “standard,” 
granted limited visitation.215  A joint custodial arrangement, on 
the other hand, permits greater contact with both parents and 
eliminates the risk of damaging effects from a parent 
withdrawing from the child’s life after the custody litigation.216  
Children recognize that they can turn to either parent for advice 
and regularly interact with both parents.217  As the father in 
Finkelstein indicated, a child may be more inclined to consult 
with one parent about certain issues.218  Mr. Finkelstein’s son, for 
example, would benefit from consulting his father, a male, as the 
boy grows up and his life “get[s] more difficult.”219  A child’s 
needs, however, are not limited to consulting a parent of the 
same sex; a child may feel a greater sense of comfort speaking 
and getting advice from a specific parent but may not have the 
option to do so in a sole custody arrangement.  Joint custody, on 
the other hand, reduces the child’s feelings of rejection and 
abandonment and “is conducive to the child’s emotional 
stability.”220 
In the event that a situation does arise where a court-
ordered joint custodial relationship turns out to be a detriment to 
the child’s well-being, at that point a parent’s fundamental right 
to the care, custody, and control of his or her child will have to 
yield to the child’s interests.  The court may be to blame for not 
properly considering any potential detriment to the child or the 
parents may be at fault for making decisions that turn out to be 
harmful to the child’s well-being.  Regardless of who is to blame, 
 
214 Robinson, supra note 14, at 32. 
215 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION, B. 4559, 232d Leg. (2009). 
216 See Robinson, supra note 14, at 33. 
217 Paradise, supra note 212, at 572–73. 
218 See Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, N.Y. L.J., May 18, 1998, at 33, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. 
Kings Cnty. 1998). 
219 See id. 
220 H. Jay Folberg & Marva Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following 
Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 523, 557 (1979). In fact, children tend to show a great 
desire to continue existing relationships with their parents. See id. A child’s desire to 
continue having both parents in his or her life does not automatically disappear 
because the parents have decided to end their relationship. 
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if such a situation arises, the parents do have the option to 
request a modification from the court.  In Hugh L. v. Fhara L.,221 
for instance, the father received a modification from a prior 
custody order that awarded the parents joint “legal decision-
making responsibility.”222  The Bronx County Supreme Court 
noted the troubling traits of both parents but still found that 
joint decision-making responsibility would “advance the best 
interests of the child.”223  The lower court, acting under New 
York’s “best interests of the child” rule, did not find any potential 
detriment to the boy’s physical or mental health resulting from 
each parent’s troubling traits.  The First Department’s rationale 
for granting a modification, on the other hand, was based on 
specific detriments that a joint custodial relationship posed on 
the child’s well-being.  The mother posed a risk of physical harm 
to the child by failing to cooperate with medical professionals,224 
opposing counseling for the child,225 and obstructing the father’s 
relationship with his son.226  The father, conversely, had made 
progress in becoming a better parent and in addressing any 
shortcomings he may have had.227  It was only the “passage of 
time” and the “development of a fuller record” that permitted the 
First Department to accurately assess the risk of joint custody.228  
But if at any time joint custody proves to be detrimental to the 
child’s well-being, a modification could and should be granted. 
 
 
221 44 A.D.3d 192, 840 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1st Dep’t 2007). Although this case 
involved incidents of domestic violence, which the father pleaded guilty to, id. at 194 
n.1, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 353 n.1, the court’s reasoning for granting a modification was 
not based on the domestic violence because there had been no recurrence of the 
domestic violence from the time of the initial custody order, and there was no 
evidence that the father had ever been abusive towards his son. Id. at 197, 840 
N.Y.S.2d at 356. 
222 Hugh L. v. Fhara L., N.Y. L.J., June 1, 2000, at 29, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Bronx 
Cnty. 2000). 
223 Id. 
224 Hugh L., 44 A.D.3d at 197, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 356. The mother preferred her 
own diagnoses to those of medical professionals, and was careless about filling and 
dispensing her child’s prescriptions. See id. at 197–98, 840 N.Y.S. at 356. 
225 Id. at 197, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 355 (pointing out that the mother refused to 
acknowledge her own deficiencies and accept that counseling would serve to benefit 
her child). 
226 Id. at 198, 840 N.Y.S.3d at 356. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
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The likely administrative and cost burdens that may be 
imposed on courts as a result of parents seeking a modification of 
a prior joint custody order are not sufficient reasons for New 
York not to adopt a joint custody presumption.  Critics of joint 
custody argue that it may increase a court’s burden because 
parents may have to return to court and request the court to 
modify custody orders when joint custody turns out to be 
unsuccessful.229  True, if joint custody proves to be unsuccessful, a 
judge will have to hear one more case and decide one more 
request, but a joint custody presumption may actually serve to 
decrease the courts’ overall burden.  Parents, knowing that a 
court must presume that joint custody is in the best interests of 
the child when there is no evidence of a potential detriment to 
the child’s well-being, may be less inclined to come to court and 
litigate custody.  Parents will have little incentive to try and 
litigate for sole custody when a joint custodial relationship is 
feasible and will ultimately be in the child’s best interests, in 
effect decreasing the number of custody cases the courts will 
need to hear.  More importantly, a fundamental right cannot be 
infringed upon merely because it may be administratively more 
efficient and less costly to decide issues concerning that right 
another way.230  A state is not justified in retaining a statutory 
scheme that unjustifiably deprives individuals of their 
fundamental rights in order to minimize costs and burdens. 
CONCLUSION 
A presumption in favor of joint custody must be adopted to 
adequately protect a parent’s fundamental right to the care, 
custody, and control of his or her child.  The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized a parent’s right to retain custody 
of his or her child as fundamental in nature.  The Court intended 
to protect the “the private realm of family life”231 and to ensure 
that parent’s are involved in the upbringing of their children.232  
 
229 See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 150 (noting that critics of joint custody 
argue that people may have to come back to court to file violations or requests to 
modify custody orders, which may “clog up the judicial system”). 
230 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (holding that a state 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment when it adopted a statute that gave a 
mandatory preference to people of a certain sex, merely to eliminate hearings on the 
merits). 
231 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
232 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923). 
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In line with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, a 
joint custody presumption would require the court to find that 
joint custody cannot be granted without a state’s compelling 
interest to protect against a detriment or harm to the child’s 
physical or mental well-being. 
The role of custody courts must be more than weeding 
through an ill-defined “best interests” rule that does not 
necessarily protect a child’s well-being.  The courts, acting on 
behalf of the state, have a vital interest in ensuring that a child’s 
relationship and bond with his or her parent is not aimlessly 
broken.  This involves more than an arbitrary and systematically 
biased application of random, judicially created “best interests” 
factors.  In order for courts to safeguard the best interests of the 
child and protect the rights of parents, the New York courts and 
Legislature must accept the long-overdue recognition that shared 
parenting is in a child’s best interests.  Moreover, both the 
Legislature and the courts need to recognize that the constitution 
mandates nothing short of a detrimental impact on the child’s 
well-being in order to trump a parent’s right to joint custody and 
shared parenting. 
 
